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FROM THE INCOMING PRESIDENT
To the Members of the Denver Bar Association:
Lawyers, more than
any other group, are informed and interested
in public affairs. They
are active in the various
organizations of our
community. They have
had, and will continue
y
to have, a prominent
part in the shaping of
our governmental policies. It is my hope and
purpose that during the
coming year the Denver
B ar Association m a y
keep abreast of the
rapidly changing and
varied problems which
confront the public. In
our association these
problems may be faced
fairly and earnestly,
with some hope of soERNEST B. FOWLER
lution. It is fitting that
in this association
interest
their
center
should
the lawyers
individual efforts
their
make
where united action may
effective.
We hope to present to the meetings legal questions of
interest to the profession, to make these meetings profitable
to the members so they will come, not because of any sense of
duty, but because they enjoy the meetings and get something
worthwhile from them. I hope opportunity will also be afforded for the members to get together socially, be entertained
and become better acquainted-in general, to carry on the
good work of my predecessors. I am counting on your help
to achieve this goal.
193

PROPOSED REVISION OF FEDERAL COURT RULES

C

HICAGO, May 21 (Special).-President William L.

Ransom of the American Bar Association announced
today that members of the American Bar Association
are invited to submit their views, criticisms and suggestions
regarding the draft of proposed uniform Rules for the Federal Courts, which have been drafted by the Advisory Committee constituted by the Supreme Court of the United States.
Copies of the draft of rules, as submitted for the opinion and
specific suggestions of the bar, are being mailed about June
first to each member of the American Bar Association. The
activity of the association in this matter is regarded as a part
of its plan for being of greater practical usefulness to the average lawyer in his professional work.
Members of the association are requested to submit their
specific suggestions as soon as practicable, in order that the
same may be assembled, analyzed, and transmitted for the
information and assistance of the Advisory Committee during the summer and of the court when it reconvenes in the
fall. Communications from members of the American Bar
Association regarding the draft of rules should be sent to the
association at No. 1140 North Dearborn Street, Chicago,
Illinois.
In addition to this opportunity for submitting views
and suggestions in writing, through the channels of the association, members of the association will have also an opportunity to discuss the draft rules orally, at "open forum"
sessions to be held at the Boston convention of the association
on Wednesday, August 26th. This conference for discussion
of the draft rules will be held under the joint auspices of the
Judicial Section, the National Conference of Judicial Councils, and the Association's Committee on Jurisprudence and
Law Reform. Former Attorney-General William D. Mitchell, as chairman of the Advisory Committee which prepared
the draft, will mako an opening statement regarding the draft;
194
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and Dean Charles E. Clark of the Yale Law School, Reporter
for the Advisory Committee, will be present to answer questions and make desired explanations of controversial points in
the draft.
President Ransom said today that these "open forum"
sessions for discussion and the offering of suggestions regarding the draft of rules "are likely to prove among the most
interesting and useful of the many attractive features arranged
for this year's annual meeting of the American Bar Association." He added that, "it is deemed to be especially appropriate that the whole membership of the association shall
have the opportunity to take part in furthering the proposed
rules and in offering specific suggestions for the improvement
of the submitted draft, inasmuch as the promulgation of such
rules for the improvement of procedure and practice in the
Federal Courts is a project long advocated by the American
Bar Association as one of its most earnest objectives. The
establishment of simplified and uniform rules for the Federal
Courts will prove to be an important step for the improvement of the administration of justice, along lines urged by
the American Bar Association for many years. The court and
its Advisory Committee have taken an appropriate step in
arranging for the submission of a copy of the draft rules to
each member of the American Bar Association, and the members of the association will doubtless show their appreciation
of this recognition, by availing themselves of the opportunity
to support the project and offer constructive suggestions for
betterment of the draft which is being submitted for the consideration of the bar in advance of its consideration by the
Court as well as in advance of final action by the Advisory
Committee."

PATRON SAINTS OF LAWYERS
By HARRY C. GREEN, of the Denver Bar

D

ENVER and Colorado lawyers will be interested to
know there is a patron saint for lawyers. After nearly
700 years he has been discovered by the American Bar
Association, and he will be honored by that august body during the month of May. It is also interesting to note that this
same ancient lawyer can logically be considered to be the
founder of the modern legal aid movement.
Back in the thirteenth century lawyers were sometimes
regarded with suspicion, the same as at the present time. This
particular saintly lawyer was a wonderment to his people
inasmuch as he was not a thief.
In the Denver Post, Sunday, April 26, 1936, in Section
3, page 5, under the heading, "'Just Ask the Post"-answers
by Frederick J. Haskin, Director, Washington, D. C., is the
question and answer:
Q. Who is the patron saint of lawyers?-C. D.
A. St. Ives. The American Bar Association has presented a memorial window in his honor to the cathedral at
Treguier, Brittany, France. It will be dedicated on May 18.
The Catholic Encyclopedia gives the following biographical sketch.
Ives (Yves), Saint, born at Kermartin, near Treguier,
Brittany (France), 17 October, 1253; died at Louannec, 19
May, 1303, was the son of Helori, lord of Kermartin, and
Asodu Kenquis. In 1267 Ives was sent to the University of
Paris, where he graduated in Civil Law. He went to Orleans
in 1277 to study Canon Law. On his return to Brittany,
having received minor orders, he was appointed "official," or

ecclesiastical judge, of the archdeanery of the Rennes (1280) ;
meanwhile he studied Scripture, and there are strong reasons
for holding that he joined the Franciscan Tertiaries some time
later at Guimgamp. He was soon invited by the Bishop of
196
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Treguier to become his "official," and accepted the offer
(1284).
He displayed great zeal and rectitude in the discharge of his duty and did not hesitate to resist the unjust
taxation of the king, which he considered an encroachment
on the rights of the Church; by his charity he gained the title
of Advocate-and Patron of the Poor. Having been ordained, he was appointed to the parish of Tredrez in 1285
and eight years later to Louannec, where he died. He was
buried in Treguier, and was canonized in 1347 by Clement
VI, his feast being kept on 19 May. He is the patron of lawyers, though not it is said their model, for-"Sanctus Ivo
erat Brito, Advocatus et non latro, Res Mirando populo."
"Saint Ives was a Briton. He was a lawyer and not a
thief-a thing that caused the people much wonder."

LITIGATION EXTRAORDINARY
We have received from Hon. Geo. F. Dunklee a synopsis
In re case No. 60052, Div. 2, In the Matter of the Adjudication of
Priorities of Water Rights for the use of water for irrigation and other
beneficial uses in Irrigation District No. 7, Div. No. 1, in the State of
Colorado.

Case No. 60052, In the District Court, Division 2, in
Re Adjudication of Priorities of Water Rights in District No.
7, Division No. 1, State of Colorado.
Case filed in District Court, City and County of Denver,
Colorado, May 13, 1915.
Number of ditches, 28.
Number of reservoirs, 133.
Number of pages to decree, 709.
Number of pages to index, 3.
Total number of pages, 712.
District No. 7, Division No. 1, comprises all water from
Clear Creek and tributaries.
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Number of attorneys appearing, 44.
Principal ditches: Farmers High Line Canal, Agricultural Ditch and Church Ditch.
Largest reservoirs: Standley Lake, Hyatt Lake, Leyden
Lake and Broad Lake.
Testimony taken:
Before the referee, 2500.
Before the court, 1119.
Case before referee from May 13, 19 15, to December 15,
1934, when testimony was taken before Judge Geo. F. Dunklee. Last testimony taken before Judge Dunklee November
5, 1935. Number of witnesses appearing before the court,
216.
Decree lodged in clerk's office March 14, 1936, and case
continued to April 14, 1936, to give attorneys time to inspect
same before signing of decree.
May 13, 1936, decree signed by the court.
I am told that that case was pending longer than other
cases in the District Court, and that the decree that consists of
712 pages of typewritten matter and involves 28 ditches and
133 reservoirs, making 161 different individual adjudications, and extending over a period of 21 years, or from May
13, 1915, when the case was filed in the District Court, to
May 13, 1936, is probably one of the largest filed in this
court.
GEO. F. DUNKLEE.

DICTA has again been honored, and Mr. G. A. H. Fraser
has received the nice tribute from the Massachusetts Bar
Quarterly of having a request for permission to reprint in
that fine magazine his article entitled "Recent Constitutional
Law in the Supreme Court."
The circulation of the Quarterly is 1,800.

THE BALANCE SHEET FOR COORDINATION:
LIABILITIES

C

By WM. H. ROBINSON, JR.

AN the American Bar Association become an organism
which will respond to and reflect the mass opinion of
approximately 170,000 lawyers? Can a nation-wide
organization of lawyers be formulated from present raw
materials so that it will be of real service to the public and to
the profession?
These questions have possessed a peculiar significance
ever since the American Bar Association under its present
three-year campaign decided to devote $50,000 of its funds
together with a like sum granted by the Carnegie Corporation.
But the questions are neither new nor novel, for the spectre of
coordination has jangled its chains at various meetings of the
association ever since Simeon Baldwin issued the call for the
organization in 1878.
Perhaps, like any practical business man, it is now time
for the national association, as well as lawyers everywhere, to
draw a balance sheet, to see whether the venture so far shows
a loss or profit. There are certain factors which stand in the
way of a structural and functional approach to the creation of
a representative national organization. The individualistic
attitude of the lawyer, first of all, has long hindered the
growth of any plan which appears to him to be collectivism
or regimentation. To a representative lawyer, the idea of cohesive and unified state and national organizations, responsible to the lawyer and to his benefit is an antipathy. This
feeling so permeates his thoughts that he approaches plans for
coordination (if he can be persuaded to study them at all)
with an inborn sense of prejudice. As a result, probably not
more than 25 % of the 170,000 lawyers have any real conception of the coordination movement and its potential value to
the lawyer and to the public.
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This individualistic attitude is the first liability item on
our balance sheet. . The second, and perhaps a corollary of the
first, is that few lawyers know anything about coordination
as a result of an inadequate program of publicity. They confuse it with integration. They fail to see that the National
Bar Program is a means to an end. Coordination, integration,
National Bar Program are to many merely words. The
American Bar Association has popularized the words, but the
significance of these movements has not been made plain nor
has it become known to the practicing lawyer. The national
association has failed to realize that to accomplish ultimate
coordination, an intense, active program of publicity reaching
out to the public and the lawyer alike must be well planned
and vigorously maintained.
There is a strong feeling among many of the lawyers of
the national association, especially among those who are influential in its management, that a sustained, well-directed publicity campaign is to be avoided. As a result of this policy, a
few innocuous announcements by committee chairmen,
lengthy pamphlets, articles in the American Bar Association
Journal, and speeches by officials of the association constitute
the sole means of publicity.
It seems apparent that the success of the coordination
movement rests on two broad bases. First, the great majority
of the lawyers must be so interested that they will demand a
national representative organization. Second, that the public
must openly urge a better, more responsible organization of
lawyers as a necessary element of the more efficient and just
administration of the law. In other words, the public shall
insist, and lawyers must desire, that a lawyer be what he by
oath and tradition is supposed to be: An officer of the courts
-a component part of the judicial branch of government.
At the present time, lawyers are largely apathetic, if not
entirely adverse, to any plans in their own behalf, even
though the public and the press are openly antagonistic to the
lawyer.
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As the experience of other national professional organizations has adequately proved, both of these conditions can,
to a large extent, be eradicated by intelligent publicity. Dr.
Baer and Dr. Fishbein, who are largely responsible for the
present status of the American Medical Association, have had
the vision to see that intelligent publicity and propaganda was
necessary to build a cohesive national unit of medical men.
If the history of the development of the American Medical Association is traced, it will be noted that at the early part
of the century the doctor was an individual regarded with
some suspicion and hostility by the general public. The weak
and unrepresentative national medical organization of that
time was not strong or representative enough to combat this
thoroughly adverse public opinion.
Then the association was radically reorganized, and by
means of the new organization, the doctors as a unit started
to charge the unfavorable attitude of the public. Today the
medical man stands far above the lawyer and judge in the
esteem of the public. It is striking that this publicity campaign, which has two phases; namely, education of the public,
and creation of a desire on. the part of the doctor for a national
group, has resulted in tangible benefits for the doctor. It has
created a public understanding of the problems of the doctor,
and through such work as that done by the committees on
foods, drugs, and public information of the American Medical
Association, it has made the public suspicious of quacks and
medical nostrums but favorable to licensed physicians. It has
made available to the general practitioner and the specialist
nearly every bit of published medical learning by means of a
packet service which is sent on request to any A. M. A. member. It has created a hundred page weekly journal which is
indispensable to the doctor. It has created professional credit
organizations which have undertaken the collection of bills.
It has built numerous other services so that now about 90 %
of doctors actively engaged in practice are members of the
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national organization, which has an annual budget of over a
million and a half dollars.
. The American Dental Association since the World War
has been following along this path, with results not as prolific, but nevertheless thoroughly worthwhile.
Business
groups, like the United Chamber of Commerce, have had similar experiences.
The American Bar Association, in contrast, has been
actively engaged in the present coordination movement for
the past several years. During the past two fiscal years
$65,000 will have been spent to bring about a national representative organization of lawyers. Yet of this sum not more
than $5,000 has actually been spent for constructive publicity; and unless there is a radical revision of policy, which at
the present time seems impossible, less than seven per cent of
the total budget of $100,000 will be devoted to these purposes. With such an inadequate sum as this, it seems improbable either that the public will understand or will be sympathetic to the lawyers' problems or that an intense desire can be
created on the part of the lawyer for coordination.
To the liabilities of the individualistic attitude of the
lawyer, and inadequate publicity, fiust be added anotherthe present type of bar organizations. There are in existence
today approximately 1,450 bar groups, ranging from largely
inactive and loosely organized societies through social organizations to efficient and aggressive associations. Few local associations have any organic or structural connection with the
state organization and none has with the national. As a result
each, for the most part, is a little empire attempting to be selfsufficient and jealously warding off alleged entangling alliances and usurpation of power. Of the forty-eight state bar
associations only a dozen have any organic or structural connection with the local bar associations. In some states, such
as New York and Massachusetts, local organizations have as
much if not more prestige than the state associations. In
others, especially the seventeen integrated bar states, the local
associations are for the most part subservient to the state asso-
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ciation. In several, notably Louisiana, two state bar associations exist.
This condition makes it exceedingly difficult at the present to create a national organization which will be representative of all of the various local and state associations, and
thereby of the lawyer. What associations are entitled to representation? The state?
Our own local situation will illustrate the impossibility
of using this base. The Denver Bar Association has 625
members. The Colorado Bar AssoCiation has only 510. Our
state association cannot and does not pretend to answer for
the 1,563 lawyers practicing in the state, nor does the Denver
Bar Association. Furthermore, at the present time only fortythree per cent of the members of the Colorado Bar Association
are members of the national association. In contrast, the
integrated bars represent one hundred per cent of the lawyers
practicing within the state. But in integrated bar states membership in the American Bar Association range from eleven
per cent to thirty-two per cent of the total number of enrolled
lawyers. From these statements it is apparent that the voluntary state associations have a low percentage of members in
the national association and are unrepresentative of practicing
lawyers and the integrated bar states have a small national
membership.
Is, then, the proper basis for representation the local
groups? But an affirmative answer to this question faces three
serious obstacles. First, the local groups should logically be
made an integral part of the state organization. Second,
large numbers of attorneys and many geographical sections
will be entirely without representation. Finally, the local
associations vary greatly in prestige, influence, membership
percentages, and type of organization and functions. It,
therefore, seems utterly impossible to use the local associations
on any broad basis of representation.
Any plan based on representation of lawyers through
membership in state and local bar associations must find a satisfactory solution to these problems. No plan has yet been
advanced which satisfactorily solves the general problem.
Perhaps none ever will unless an effort is made to bring about
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either integrated or federalized state bar associations and from
this foundation to build a truly American Bar Association.
The fourth detriment to complete coordination is that
the American Bar Association gives little direct and tangible
return for the pecuniary and time investment of the lawyer.
At the present time the 27,235 members of the American Bar
Association belong to the association for any one of three reasons: (1) They enjoy bar association work; (2) they became
members through the insistence of a friend; or (3) they believed that the association- afforded a good opportunity for
national contacts. The latter classification by far leads the
list, but it cannot continue much longer as a reason, for its
potentialities fade as membership increases and as competition
thereby increases.
To attract new members in any large numbers, some
return for dues must be offered, just as the American Medical
Association gave increased service. The rapid growth of the
American Medical Association is ample proof that the interest
of a profession in an association is in proportion to the service
the association is able to render its members. In 1901, the
date of the radical revision of the American Medical Association, it had 10,600 members. In the next four years, membership had been increased by 75 %, in ten years it gained
700 %, and today it has an increase of 980 % over the 1901
membership.
In contrast the American Bar Association has grown at
the average rate of about 480 members a year and during the
past three years, in spite of the emphasis of the National Bar
Program, the growth has been less than 50 % of the average
increase. According to the 1934 Report, there were 27,036
members. This fiscal year the membership had actually
increased by only 199, and much of this growth can be credited to the activity of the convention committee in Los Angeles, as is shown by the fact that California in 1934 had
1,659 members, while in 1935 it had 2,060.
Figures may be dry reading, but the proof they present
is inescapable. Various conclusions may be drawn as to the
cause of the proof, but this one thing seems to stand out:
That from a strictly pecuniary point of view, membership in
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the American Bar Association is a poor investment unless it is
followed by personal contacts at annual conventions, sectional and committee meetings. For eight dollars a '>:.r the
lawyer receives twelve copies of the Journal and an annual
report, both of which he can easily be without and still be
thoroughly informed upon legal questions and the current
problems of the profession.
The proper course to be followed, it would seem, is to
make membership in the national association an essential
thing, something desired in itself by every lawyer. There are
a wealth of opportunities now existing. To suggest a few:
1. Law lists-should not the national association set
up rigid standards for acceptable lists so that lawyers will be
protected from fakes and racketeers, as is being now accomplished in Missouri?
2. The national magazine-should not it be enlarged
in size, scope, and outlook so that it approaches a needed
national law journal instead of being merely a law magazine?
3. Law books-lawyers are flooded with legal literature, some of it good, most of it bad, why not have experts
in particular fields approve or disapprove books in that field
and that which is good bear the stamp of acceptance by the
association?
4. Public relations-should not the public be informed
of what the lawyer is really doing in the behalf of the public
so that a better understanding may exist between it and the
profession?
5. Fidelity and pension funds-how can the profession
ignore these two important problems?
6. Specialized service such as packet libraries and information service.
7. Law directories-should not the national association
publish an authentic directory of lawyers, showing their
status in the legal profession, especially any disciplinary record? and
8. A weekly or biweekly newsletter or bulletin such as
that published by the Onondaga Bar Association of New
York, giving the profession the latest possible news on out-
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standing decisions, administrative rulings, and events which
affect the profession.
There are countless other ways in which a national association can be of distinct value to the individual lawyer, if
the association will take the initiative. There is not space
here to list them all, but the experiences of the Onondaga Bar
Association demonstrate that membership in an association
can be measurably increased if some value is given in exchange
for dues. Mr. R. Allen Stephens, Secretary of the Illinois
State Bar Association, who has been extremely successful in
working out this problem within his state, recently pointed
out that one reason that so many capable lawyers are not
members of any association is because that the association performed little, if any, really effective service as an organization
for lawyers.
To the individualistic attitude of the lawyers, inadequate association publicity, the present status of the various
state and local associations, and the low return on dues to the
lawyer must be added two other liabilities; namely, the present organization of the American Bar Association and the
immense amount of duplication, friction, and waste of time
and money resulting from various national legalistic organizations.
It might be well for several paragraphs to sketch briefly
the present government of the American Bar Association.
Theoretically, the governing body of this association is the
annual assembly which theoretically represents the entire
membership. Yet these conventions are not attended by more
than 2,000 members; the 1934 registration, for example, being 1,773 or approximately 7% of the total membership.
This 7 %, moreover, has no representative capacity other than
as individual members of the association. This percentage
should be considerably reduced because the main business
sessions of the convention are seldom attended by more than
one-half of those registered.
Mr. Stephens, in speaking generally of conventions,
points out the ineffectiveness of a convention as a governing
body. "Each year the setting up of an attractive annual meeting has become more difficult until today it is recognized as the
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one activity which produces the smallest return, in proportion
as the amount of work necessary to put it on is to the number
of members reached thereby, of any of the activities of any
ordinary association."
No better illustration of the unrepresentative character
convention as a governing body can be found than that of the
1935 meeting. It was Saturday, the day of the election of
officers. "Breaking the precedents of long years, the contest
for the presidency went on the floor of the house." The
tellers began the count and then Chairman Martin reported
as follows: "William L. Ranson 209; James M. Beck 178."
These two sentences taken from Mr. Joseph Taylor's able
account of the convention are one of the strongest indictments
against the present government of the American Bar Association. They indicate either (1) a machine-controlled organization or (2) lack of interest in the association; for it is to be
noted that only 387 members of the nearly two thousand registered voted in the election (or less than two per cent of the
total membership) and further, that only the office of presidency was contested.
As to the first point, several items may be noted. There
is a decided tendency for certain names to repeat themselves in
committee appointments, section chairmen, and on the General Council and Executive Committee. There is also the
report of certain state bar association delegates of which that
contained in thirty-seventh report of the Colorado Bar Association at page 148 is an example. Speaking of the alleged impropriety of one of the elections, the delegate says: "Yet this
meant nothing with that well-oiled machine that operates the
policies of the American Bar Association."
As to the second point, its mere statement is a most adequate proof.
So, then, theoretically the assembly is the governing
body of the association, but as a matter of practice the powers
of the convention, save in the matter of elections and approval
of a few reports, have been, to a large extent, delegated to the
Executive Committee. This committee is composed of the
president, retiring president, secretary, treasurer, editor of the
Journal, and chairman of the General Council, who are its
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ex-officio members, and nine members elected by the convention. Three of the nine are chosen yearly for a three year
term, and they cannot succeed themselves in office. This committee is given full power and authority in the interval between meetings to do all acts and perform all functions of the
association.
The nominating committee (except for state councils) is
the General Council, composed of one representative from
each state and territory. Nominations to the General Council
result from caucuses, informal in nature and generally sparsely
attended, held after the first meeting of the convention. Members in attendance at the convention from each state or territory gather to make the nomination for their respective state
or territory. Nominations of these caucuses are presented by
the secretary to the convention, which has always accepted
them, no others coming from the floor.
The State Council, largely dormant, is the committee
which fosters the work of the association in the state. It is
composed of five members from each state selected annually
by members residing in the state and its chairman is a member
of the General Council.
It is evident from this sketchy review of the government
of the national association that the association is unresponsive, unrepresentative, and has a tendency at least to internal
politic3 and machine control. The present president in recognizing this situation in a recent speech said: "A useful service,
to the profession and to the country, cannot effectively be
rendered, unless the structure of organization is such as to
elicit, in a fair and representative way, the judgment and the
experience of more than half of the lawyers of the land. A
minority opinion or recommendation, however wise and wellconsidered, does not carry great weight with those who are
glad to find pretexts for disregarding it; and the further fact
is that a genuine consensus of opinion that comes up, in a
representative way, from the lawyers in all of the states, is
much more significant and sound than the views of any group
or leadership, however select and sagacious. The determinations made and the actions taken by and through the Ameri-

DICTA

209

can Bar Association, in the name of the legal profession, need
and should have the sanctions and support which can come
only if they are the representative decisions of those freely
chosen to act and speak in behalf of a majority of the lawyers
of the whole country."
And again he has said: "In many respects it (the structure) has become antiquated, casual, unrepresentative and
unsuitable for so large and important an organization."
At the present time plans have been submitted to and
approved by the Executive Committee which will radically
change the present government in an effort to make it responsive. A House of Delegates is proposed, and certain other
reforms suggested which I will outline more fully in a subsequent article.
Finally, there is one other liability that must be considered. It may be only a minor one, yet nevertheless one that
exists. There are several national organizations of lawyers:
The American Law Institute, The American Judicature Society, The Association of American Law Schools, The National
Bar Association, The National Conference of Bar Examiners,
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, The Association of Attorney Generals, the women
lawyers' national association, the Patent Bar, and other federal departmental bars-to mention a few of the most prominent. Each one of the associations and organizations, to a
large extent, duplicates work done by the others. In addition
to the waste of time and money, these associations engender
cross-currents of conflicting loyalties and jealousies. There is
no attempt at a coordination of their programs, no attempt
to present a united front on vital problems of the profession,
and no attempt to serve the lawyers as a class.
These, then, are the liabilities: (1) individualistic attitude of the lawyer; (2) inadequate and doubtful public relations; (3) the present status of bar associations; (4) low
return for law dues; (5) the present organization of the
American Bar Association, and (6) duplication among existing legal organizations. However, the balance sheet is not all
a listing of liabilities. In a subsequent article I propose to
deal with the assets.

INTOXICATING LIQUORS-LICENSE-JURISDICTION-MANDAMUS-

Saunders, Secretary of State vs. Norton-No. 13946-Decided
May 11, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
This is an action in mandamus brought in the county court of
the City and County of Denver by Norton to compel Saunders, as Secretary of State and ex officio state licensing authority, to issue to him a
renewal of his license to conduct a retail liquor store in the town of
Garden City, Weld County, Colorado. Judgment was for Norton on
the license feature of the case.
1. Chapter 142, Session Laws of 1935 (liquor law) provides
a special method for reviewing the action of the state licensing authority
in refusing a license and is controlling. This special proceeding provides
for a review by application of writ of certiorari to any court of general
jurisdiction having jurisdiction of the place for which the application
for license was made.
2. The application for license having been made in Weld
County,. the county court of the City and County of Denver had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the litigation and the demurrer
which raised this question should have been sustained. Respondent did
not waive the jurisdictional question by proceeding further. He could
do nothing to invest the court with jurisdiction over a matter of which,
in view of the statutory provision, it did not have, and could not
acquire. All the subsequent proceedings, including the judgment, were
void.--Judgment reversed with directions to sustain the special demurrer and dismiss the action.
Mr. Justice Hilliard not participating.
AUTOMOBILES-CAR STRIKING PEDESTRIAN AT CROSSING---CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-QUESTION FOR JURY-Publix Cab

Company, et al. vs. Phillips-No. 13667-Decided May 11,
1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice Young.
Phillips recovered judgment below for damages for personal injuries caused by his being struck by a taxicab belonging to defendants
which he claimed was negligently driven and operated.
1. There was a sufficient showing of negligence on the part of
the defendant's driver to carry the case to the jury.
2. Section 15-A of the Denver ordinance giving a pedestrian the
right of way at a street crossing means that when a person is crossing a
street at an intersection to which the provisions of the ordinance are
applicable, and an automobile is approaching the crossing at a speed
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and on a course such that he or the car must alter speed or direction to
avoid a collision, the driver of the auto must so act as to avoid running
down the pedestrian, and his failure to do so is a violation of the ordinance and constitutes negligence.
3. Where there is no conflict in the testimony bearing upon the
subject either of negligence or contributory negligence, the court may,
in a clear case, treat the question as one of law, and grant a nonsuit or
direct a verdict; but when the determination of the question depends
upon the inference to be drawn from a variety of facts and circumstances, in the consideration of which there is room for a substantial
difference of opinion between intelligent and upright men, then the
question should be submitted to the jury under appropriate instructions, even though there be no conflict in the testimony.
4. The question of contributory negligence was properly sub-

mitted to the jury.-Judgment affirmed.
Mr. Justice Holland dissents.

FRAUD-SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT-CHATTEL MORTGAGES
FRAUDULENT AS AGAINST CREDITORS-Bowman, as Trustee in

Bankruptcy vs. Melnich, et al.-No. 13740-Decided May 4,
1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
A demurrer was sustained by the district court to plaintiff's
amended complaint, on which he elected to stand, and cause was dismissed. He seeks reversal.
1. This action purports to attack the validity of the chattel
mortgages, and even though it is by a trustee in bankruptcy, the bankruptcy act is not applicable. The solution of the question of whether
or not the mortgages are valid depends upon, and is controlled by, the
laws of the state where they were executed.
2. The demurrer was general upon the ground that the complaint as amended did not state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of
action, and was argued on the ground that it does not allege that the
plaintiff represents creditors who were such at the time of the execution
of the chattel mortgages or prior thereto; who were creditors at the time
of the commencement of this action; also that it does not allege that
the defendants and the bankrupt conspired or agreed to do the things of
which complaint is made for the purpose of hindering, delaying or
defrauding subsequent creditors, alleged to have been defrauded; and
further, because there is no allegation that the bankrupt became insolvent at the time of the making of the chattel mortgages. It was not
necessary to allege the above matters in the complaint.
3. The question presented by the amended complaint is not one
of fraudulent intent, and it is not a question of whether the trustee of
all the bankrupt's creditors represents a particular creditor who was
such at the time of the conveyance in question or subsequent thereto;
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neither is the question one of failure to allege that the bankrupt was or
became insolvent at the time of and an account of the transaction. The
real question presented upon the face of the complaint is: Was the
transaction ipso facto a fraud upon the then existing creditors and an
increase of the liability of the corporation from which it received no
benefit?
4. Where, among other things, the amended complaint alleges
that the chattel mortgages were made while the said bankrupt was
indebted in large sums of money and in contemplation of the incurring
of other large debts, by reason whereof the chattel mortgages were
fraudulent and void as to the creditors of said bankrupt, and the plaintiff, as trustee of the bankrupt estate, it stated a cause of action and the
demurrer should have been overruled.
5. If the allegation as to the then existing indebtedness is true,
the defendants, as directors and sole stockholders, are chargeable with
knowledge of the existing financial condition of the company. By the
transaction, they added nothing to the assets of an indebted corporation,
but did increase its liabilities to the amount of the questioned chattel
mortgages, and by the transaction they shifted their position from that
of stockholders of an involved corporation to that of preferred creditors
with a first lien upon the assets of a burdened corporation from which
they severed their connections. While the transaction may have been
free of any dishonest intention, yet it operated in law as an injury and
fraud upon creditors.-Judgmentreversed with instructions to reinstate
the amended complaint.
Mr. Justice Hilliard, Mr. Justice Bouck and Mr. Justice Young
dissent.
SALES

-INSTALLMENT

CONTRACT

FOR

DELIVERY

OF

MILK

BREACH-RIGHT TO RESCIND-WARRANTY-Myers vs. Anderson-No. 13660-Decided March 16, 1936--Opinion by Mr.
Justice Holland.
Myers contracted to purchase daily supply of milk from Anderson's dairy for a period of five years to be distributed to Myer's customers. There was a warranty that milk should be pure and unadulterated new milk and comply wtih the laws, rules and regulations
of the State of Colorado and City of Alamosa regarding the inspection of cows and the handling of milk and its by-products. The undisputed evidence showed that the milk at different times was not of
the quality required and that it was too high in bacteria count to comply with the ordinance and after many of said deliveries were accepted
under protest and the milk still failed to comply with the contract,
Myers declined to accept any more deliveries. Suit below was for
damage for breach of contract in refusing to accept deliveries and verdict was for plaintiff for damages.
1. Myers was bound only to take and pay for pure milk.
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2. If at times he accepted an inferior product, he did not thereby
waive his right to refuse to take milk not in accordance with the contract.
3. Even though this was in the nature of an installment contract, the rule that a buyer in accepting installments of milk of an
inferior quality waives the right to refuse further deliveries, should
not be strictly applied.
4. When Anderson defaulted then Myers could rescind the contract as a whole if Anderson persisted on delivering installments of
inferior milk.
5. The uncontradicted evidence discloses that Anderson failed
to comply with the terms of the contract and that Myers was relieved
therefrom and Myers' motion for a directed verdict should have been
granted.--Judgment reversed.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-ZONING ORDINANCES-BUSINESS DisTRICT-RESIDENCE DISTRICT-MANDAMUS-Hedgcock vs. Peo-

ple of the State of Colorado on the Relation of Arden Realty and
Investment Company-No. 13566-Decided April 6, 1936Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
Arden Realty and Investment Company brought suit in mandamus
against Hedgcock as building inspector, Denver, to grant relator a permit to erect a store building on its property. The defense was that the
city refused to issue a permit because the relator's property was within an
area zoned for residence purposes, as evidenced by Denver's zoning ordinance of 1925. Writ was granted below.
1. Where it appears that the relator's property is contained in a
zone restricted to use for residence purposes only, but that the property
immediately surrounding it is used almost entirely for business purposes
and that the property itself is more valuable for business purposes than
for residence purposes and is particularly suitable for business use and
that the injury to nearby residence property would be negligible if the
property were devoted to business purposes rather than residence purposes, an ordinance limiting the use of the property solely to residence
purposes is unreasonable and arbitrary and such a classification should
not be upheld.
2. A general ordinance zoning property into business districts
and residence districts and otherwise is constitutional, but such a holding
is not to be construed as passing upon and approving each and every provision of the ordinance, nor as fixing its application to every circumstance that may arise.
3. Where in a particular case to uphold the ordinance would
work an arbitrary and oppressing result, relief should be granted from
the operation thereof.
4. The courts have a right to inquire as to the reasonableness
of a zoning ordinance in its application to a given situation.
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5. Where it appears that the invasion of the property of the
plaintiff was serious and highly injurious, and since a necessary basis
for the support of that invasion is wanting, the action of the zoning
authorities comes within the ban of the constitution and cannot be sustained.
6. Mandamus was the proper remedy to invoke in this case.
7. The clear inference from the testimony is that prior to the
adoption of the zoning ordinance the block in which the relator's property is situated was a business center and has continued -so and that it
ought never to have been zoned otherwise.--Judgment affirmed.
Mr. Justice Burke and Mr. Justice Holland dissent.-Mr. Justice
Bouck will file an opinion announcing his position.
WILLS-ADVANCEMENTS-EXTRANEOUS
WRITINGS-EFFECT OF
INVENTORY-ESTOPPEL-In the Matter of the Estate of Ida

Grigsby, Deceased, et al. vs. Grigsby, Administratrix-No. 13785
-Decided April 6, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
Gail G. Grigsby, administrator of his mother's estate, filed petition
in the county court praying that certain notes that his father had given
to his mother be adjudged and decreed to be no part of the estate and
that the notes be decreed to be satisfied and cancelled. Under the terms
of her will she left one-half of her estate to her husband and $1000 to
her son, Gail, and the balance to her daughter, Ruby. Her husband
had executed notes to her aggregating $16,000 and in an' extraneous
writing the deceased indicated that she did not wish her husband's notes
to appear in her estate on account of the inheritance tax, but that the
notes must be deducted out of his share of the estate. The demurrer was
sustained both in the county court and the district court.
1. The petition to cancel the notes seeks to have invoked the doctrine of advancements but the question of advancements has no place in
consideration of the disposition of a testator's estate unless such advancements are specifically mentioned, and provision for their disposition
made in the will.
2. Extraneous written statements even tending to support the
theory of advancement are insufficient to overcome the express terms of
the will where the will is clear and unambiguous.
3. However, in this case the extraneous writings indicate that the
testatrix considered the notes in question as part of the assets of her
estate, wherein she directed in such statements that "but the notes must
be deducted out of his share."
4. Where the maker of the notes was the executor of the estate
and listed the notes in the inventory as part of the assets of the estate
he and his successors are estopped from claiming that they were not assets
to the estate.
5. Where the maker of the notes accepts the return of the notes in
settlement of his distributive share of the estate, he and his successors
are estopped from claiming that the notes were cancelled or that they
were not part of the estate.--Judgment affirmed.
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PRACTICE-DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO FILE COMPLAINT IN TEN

DAYS-POWER TO SET ASIDE DISMISSAL-Howell et a[. vs. Goldberg-No. 13803-Decided March 16, 1936-Opinion by Mr.
Justice Bouck.
Suit was instituted by service of attorney summons. Complaint
was lodged in district court under 10 days, but was mislaid and never
filed. Case was dismissed on motion for failure to file complaint. Later
order was entered over six months later setting aside dismissal and reinstating case which was then, on motion of plaintiff, dismissed without
prejudice, a new suit having been filed.
1. Where a motion to dismiss on ground of failure to file complaint within 10 days after service of summons is granted without notice
to opposite party in the suit and on newly discovered evidence the lower
court found that the complaint had been lodged but had been lost by the
clerk with no fault of plaintiff, it was proper to set aside the dismissal,
reinstate the case and permit plaintiff to take a voluntary dismissal without prejudice, so that res judicata could not be interposed in another case
between the same parties on the same cause of action.
2. Rule 5, which provides that every dismissal shall be held to be
with prejudice unless differently ordered by the court, has no application
to facts in present suit.
3. When plaintiff had no notice of hearing of dismissal and had
no opportunity of raising question of whether suit should be dismissed
with or without prejudice, the court below had jurisdiction to reinstate
the action and permit plaintiff to dismiss without prejudice.-Judgment
affirmed.
APPEAL AND ERROR-REVERSAL FOR INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
TO SUPPORT VERDICT-TRIAL DE NOVO-SUFFICIENCY OF

SHOWING-Youngblood vs. Bosick-No. 13907-Decided April
6, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice Young.
This case was before the supreme court before and was reversed for
insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict and for error of the
trial court in not sustaining a motion for a directed verdict. After the
remittitur was sent back to the district court the plaintiff sought a trial
de novo and her attorney filed an affidavit in support thereof in an
attempt to show that on a new trial the plaintiff would produce competent evidence to support her cause of action. The court below sustained a motion to dismiss and the court below denied a trial de novo
and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.
1. In order to warrant granting a new trial on the ground of
newly discovered evidence, the requirements are that it be such as will
probably change the result if a new trial is granted; that it has been discovered since the trial; that it could not have been discovered before the
trial by the exercise of due diligence; that it is material to an issue in
the case; that it is not merely cumulative to the former evidence; and
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that it does not merely tend to impeach or contradict the former evidence,
except it may be in cases where it clearly appears that it would probably
change the result in case of a new trial.
2. Where the judgment is reversed for insufficiency of evidence
and the cause is remitted to the lower court it is in the sound discretion
of the lower court to pass on the question whether or not the showing of
newly discovered evidence is sufficient to warrant retrying a case and its
judgment will not be disturbed except in case of abuse of discretion.Judgment affirmed.
TAXATION-EXEMPTIONS---SCHOOLS-LOTS AND GROUNDS-Horton, as County Treasurer, et al. vs. The Fountain Valley School
of Colorado--No. 13650-Decided April 6, 1936-Opinion by
Mr. Justice Holland.
The Fountain Valley School of Colorado is a corporation organized under the Colorado laws for educational purposes and its charter
indicates that it is not organized for pecuniary profit, the object being
to maintain a school for boys in the nature of a ranch school where they
would have the opportunity to not only have preparatory school work
but riding horseback, and for this purpose the school acquired a ranch
containing 1600 acres of which approximately 75 acres adjacent to the
buildings was irrigated land and the residue being dry land. Action
was brought below to enjoin the taxing officials from taxing the lands
and to prevent the issuance of tax deed on taxes formerly assessed. The
court below held that the buildings and that part of the land adjacent
to the buildings was exempt to taxation, but that the balance of the
land used merely for horseback riding purposes was not exempt.
1. Where it appears that the school was organized not for profit
and that not only the buildings but some 1600 acres of land was used
in connection with the school for the purpose of carrying out school
purposes not only the buildings and the ground immediately joining,
but all of the land is exempt from taxation.
2.
There is no constitutional limitation as to the number of lots
or the amount of land that may be held by schools, neither is there any
statutory limitation as to the extent of grounds that may be used in
connection with schools.
3.
While the statute of exemptions used the word "lots" lots
include "grounds."
4.
The fundamental object of the law exempting school property
from taxation is to exempt property used for school purposes. To carry
out this design, the uses permissible must necessarily embrace all which
are proper and appropriate to effect the objects of the institution claiming
the benefits of the exemption.-Judgment affirmed insofar as it exempts
a portion of the property from taxation, and reversed, as to the nonexemption applied to the residue of the real property involved.
Mr. Justice Burke and Mr. Justice Butler concur for affirmance of
the judgment in its entirety.-Mr. Justice Young not participating.
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NEGOTIARLE INSTRUMENTS-INSTRUCTIONS-ORAL EVIDENCE TO
SHOW CONDITIONAL DELIVERY-McCaffrey vs. Mitchell-No.
13536-Decided April 6, 1936-Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
In 1929 McCaffrey sold to Mitchell certain real property and as
part of the consideration Mitchell gave his promissory note for $200
The
secured by second deed of trust, which note is in controversy.
defense was that the plaintiff had orally agreed to look for payment of
the note only to the real property and second, that the plaintiff had
accepted certain assignment as payment and, third, that there was another suit pending for the same cause of action in justice court. At the
trial the court below dismissed the first and third defenses and submitted
to the jury solely on the defense as to whether or not the assignment
had been accepted as payment.
1. Where there is no evidence to show an implied acceptance of an
assignment in settlement, it is error to submit an instruction thereon to
the jury that such acceptance might be either express or implied.
2.
An attorney employed to collect a note has no implied authority to settle the note otherwise than for cash.
3.
An attorney without special authority who receives an assignment instead of cash in settlement of a note does not thereby bind his
client.
4.
It is error for the court not to submit to the jury the defense
that as part of the consideration for the execution of the promissory note
that the payee orally agreed at the time the note was signed that the
payee would look only to the property secured by the note and would
not hold the defendant personally liable on the note.
5.
While ordinarily, parol evidence may not be produced to vary
the terms of a promissory note, yet when the controversy is between the
original parties to the note, parol evidence is admissible which goes to
the very existence of the note as an actual obligation. Where the parol
evidence is to show that it had no validity as a binding contract and that
it was delivered conditionally, parol evidence is admissible.
6.
The defense that a prior suit was still pending in justice court
is properly stricken, where it appears that the former suit was brought
in justice court and that there was a request by the plaintiff to dismiss
it and that for more than a year no further action was taken in the
justice court by either party, and under such circumstances the action was
legally discontinued by abandonment.-Judgment reversed.
Mr. Justice Bouck will file a specially concurring opinion.-Mr.
Justice Young specially concurs.
MECHANIC'S LIEN - MOTION - MOTION FOR NONSUIT - SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE-QUANTUM MERUIT-Fagg vs. Courtright-No. 13782-Decided April 6, 1936--Opinion by Mr.
Justice Bouck.
Courtright brought suit below against Fagg to enforce a mechanic's lien. Money judgment was entered and a lien was decreed upon
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certain real property. Plaintiff was a plumbing contractor and entered
into a written contract to furnish plumbing for a cottage camp which
provided for certain payments to be made when the rough work was
completed and the balance to be paid upon completion of the contract.
After the plaintiff had completed the rough work the defendant became
financially unable to make the payments and offered to enter into a new
contract, which was declined, and as payments were not made the plumbing contractor ceased work.
1. Under the circumstances the plumbing contractor was entitled
to withdraw from the work and to recover as for quantum meruit.
2. The evidence being conflicting the appellate court has no right
to interfere with the conclusions duly arrived at in the trial court on conflicting evidence.-Judgment affirmed.
PLEADING-MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS-ISSUES OF
FACT-TESTAMENTARY INSTRUMENT-Franco et al. vs. Gould,

Administrator-No. 13898-Decided March 30, 1936--Opinion
by Mr. Justice Bouck.
This action was brought in the district court by the administrator
of the estate of one Thomas Roberts to set aside a deed filed and acknowledged by Roberts, dated June 2, 1934, and purporting to convey certain
real estate to George Franco and Nellie Franco. The complaint was
based on fraud, duress and undue influence, principally, and the defendants denied all these allegations in their answer and the answer also contained a second defense setting up a written contract for the conveyance
of the land pursuant to which the deed was executed.
The plaintiff failed to plead to the second defense and filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings which was sustained and judgment
entered against the Francos, ordering a cancellation of the deed.
1. A motion for judgment on the pleading is never proper when
there remains any issue of fact which has not been tried.
2. Question whether or not the deed is a mere testamentary instrument and not executed with the formalities prescribed for a will,
no opinion is expressed thereon, as the case is being sent back for further
proceedings. To pass on the question at this time would be to treat the
motion for judgment on the pleadings as equivalent to a general demurrer. That would be contrary to good practice and would be an invasion
of the field properly belonging to the trial court.--Judgment reversed
with directions.

IS THIS A PART OF THE NEW DEAL?
"*

*

* for though we have seen much of the liberality of Nevada

practice, we assume that even in that forward-looking jurisdiction parties to a cause of divorce may not litigate by day and copulate by night,
inter sese et pendente lite."
Holt vs. Holt, 77 Fed. (2) 538, at 540, U. S. Court of Appeals
for District of Columbia.

